Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
College of Business Faculty Publications

College of Business

11-2010

Multi-level reputation signals in service industries
in Latin America
William Newburry
Department of Management and International Business, Florida International University,
william.newburry@business.fiu.edu

M. Abrahim Soleimani
Department of Management and International Business, Florida International University, abrahim.soleimani@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/business_fac
Part of the Business Commons
Recommended Citation
Newburry, W. & Soleimani, M. A. (2011). Multi-level reputation signals in service industries in Latin America. Innovar, 21(39),
191-203.

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in College
of Business Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

AIB-LAT 2010

- best paper award

re v is ta

innovar

journal

Señales de Reputación Multinivel en las industrias
del servicio en América Latina

Multi-level reputation signals in
service industries in Latin America

Resumen: El presente estudio se basa en la teoría de señales para

la investigación de la industria –firma–, y en la valoración individualizada de determinantes para niveles individuales de reputación
corporativa, dentro del contexto latinoamericano. Nuestra teoría se
testeó a través de un modelo linear jerárquico usando 76,419 evaluaciones individuales de 80 compañías, en cinco países latinoamericanos, que fueron recopiladas por el Reputation Institute, en conjunto
con el Foro de Reputación Corporativa. A través de toda esta muestra latinoamericana, los resultados arrojaron que la reputación de
las firmas que pertenecen a las industrias de energía y de telecomunicaciones, es significativamente más baja que la de las firmas
manufactureras. Adicionalmente, se encontró evidencia consistente entre grupos marginados (ej., mujeres, clases sociales bajas, con
poca educación e ingresos) puesto que tienden a valorar de manera más alta la reputación de la industria de telecomunicaciones que
otros grupos en mejores condiciones. Estos resultados son mixtos
si se consideran las valoraciones que se han obtenido sobre otras
industrias de servicio, entre grupos marginales. Además, y contrario
a las expectativas, no se encontró evidencia de que el tamaño de la
firma o su desempeño financiero, produzca un impacto en la forma
de valorar su reputación.
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Signaux de Réputation Multi niveau dans les
industries de service en Amérique Latine
Résumé : Cette étude se base sur la théorie des signaux pour la recherche de l’industrie et sur l’évaluation individualisée d’éléments
déterminants pour les niveaux individuels de réputation corporative,
dans le contexte latino-américain. Notre théorie a été testée par un
modèle linéaire hiérarchique utilisant 76,419 évaluations individuelles de 80 compagnies, dans 5 pays latino-américains, rassemblés
par le Reputation Institute, en association avec le « Foro de Reputación Corporativa ». A partir de cet échantillon latino-américain, les
résultats ont signalé que la réputation des firmes qui appartiennent
aux industries d’énergie et de télécommunications est beaucoup
plus basse que celle des firmes manufacturières. Il a également été
évident que parmi les groupes marginaux (par exemple, les femmes,
les classes sociales peu élevées, avec peu d’éducation et de ressources) les personnes ont tendance à évaluer la réputation de l’industrie
de télécommunications à un niveau plus élevé que d’autres groupes
en meilleures conditions. Ces résultats sont mixtes si l’on considère
les évaluations obtenues dans d’autres industries de service, parmi
les groupes marginaux. De plus, contrairement aux expectatives, il
n’a pas été démontré que la grandeur de l’entreprise ou son développement financier a un effet sur le mode d’évaluation de sa réputation
Palabras clave: réputation corporative, théorie des signaux, marginalisation, industries de services, Amérique Latine

Sinais de Reputação Multinível nas indústrias de
serviço na América Latina
Resumo: O presente estudo baseia-se na teoria de sinais para a pesquisa da indústria –firma–, e na valorização individualizada de determinantes para níveis individuais de reputação corporativa, dentro do
contexto latino americano. Nossa teoria foi testada através de um
modelo linear hierárquico usando 76,419 avaliações individuais de 80
companhias, em cinco países latino-americanos, que foram compiladas pelo Reputation Institute, em conjunto com o Fórum de Reputação Corporativa. Através de toda esta mostra latino-americana, os
resultados demonstraram que a reputação das firmas que pertencem
às indústrias de energia e de telecomunicações, é significativamente
mais baixa que a das firmas manufatureiras. Adicionalmente, encontrou-se evidência consistente entre grupos marginalizados (ex., mulheres, classes sociais baixas, com pouca educação e receita) posto
que tendem a valorizar de maneira mais alta a reputação da indústria
de telecomunicações que outros grupos em melhores condições. Estes resultados são mistos se consideram-se as valorizações que se
obtiveram sobre outras indústrias de serviço, entre grupos marginalizados. Além disso, e contrário às expectativas, não se encontrou
evidência de que o tamanho da firma ou seu desempenho financeiro,
produza um impacto na forma de valorizar sua reputação.
Palavras chave: reputação corporativa, teoria de sinais, marginalização, indústrias de serviços, América Latina.

Abstract: This study uses signaling theory to investigate industry -firm- and individual-level
determinants of individual-level corporate reputation assessments in the context of Latin America.
In a hierarchical linear model, we test our theory using 76,419 individual evaluations of 80 companies in five Latin American countries collected by the Reputation Institute in conjunction with the
Foro de Reputación Corporativa. Results show that across our Latin American sample, reputations
of firms in the telecom and energy industries are significantly lower than those of manufacturing
firms. Additionally, we find consistent evidence across marginalized groups (e.g., women, lower
social class, education and income) that they assess telecom industry reputations relatively higher
than their less marginalized counterparts do. Results are mixed with regards to marginalized group
assessments of firms from other service industries. Additionally, counter to expectations, we do not
find evidence that firm size or financial performance impact reputation assessments.
Keywords: corporate reputation, signaling theory, marginalization, service industries, Latin
America

INTRODUCTION1
Corporate reputation refers to the overall knowledge and esteem about a
corporation held by the public (Fombrun, 1996), and is well established as a
significant interest area in the strategy field (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). As
emerging market investment gains scholar and practitioner interest (Meyer,
2004), a better understanding of the factors influencing firm reputations
in this context is becoming increasingly useful and important. Responding to trade liberalization starting in the late 1980s, MNC investment into
Latin America increased five-fold in the 1990s to a peak of US$108 billion
(Casanova, 2005; Robles et al., 2003), changing the competitive dynamics
between firms in the region (Dasu & de la Torre, 1997), and increasing the
relevance of examining reputation perceptions in this region. Given this research need, this manuscript examines individual- and firm-level predictors
of firm reputation in five Latin American countries to discover which firm
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and individual characteristics are associated with firm reputations. Using signaling theory (e.g., Basdeo et al., 2006),
we suggest that certain industry and firm-level factors will
serve as signals which are interpreted differently by individuals with different demographic characteristics when
making reputation evaluations.
While interest in Latin America has increased, it has not
been uniform across industries. Mirroring the major foreign
direct investment patterns in the region, which were largely influenced by deregulation and privatization (e.g., Casanova, 2005; Dasu & de la Torre, 1997; Robles et al., 2003),
this examination focuses on investment in several service
industries, including telecommunications, retail, energy
provision and banking. These industries vary significantly regarding the degree to which individuals interact with
companies, along with the nature of these interactions. As
such, factors affecting reputation assessments could differ
significantly, and thus, the previous questions will be examined in terms of whether reputation assessments differ
across different service industries.
192

Theoretically and empirically examining the largely understudied Latin American region is an important goal in
itself. Emerging markets have gained significant interest
amongst international business and management scholars (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Meyer, 2004; London & Hart,
2004). However, the vast majority of academic work in this
area has focused on China. Greater knowledge of non-Chinese emerging markets would benefit both academics, in
terms of refining and expanding existing theories, as well
as managers, who are increasingly being drawn to these
regions. Greater knowledge of Latin America may also
provide insights into the future of the neighboring United
States, as the origin of what is now the largest U.S. minority group, with Hispanics accounting for 14.8% of the U.S.
population as of 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
In this manuscript, we next briefly review relevant literature and develop hypotheses predicting a respondent’s assessment of firm reputation. We then present the study
methodology, followed by our results. Our analysis is based
upon 76,419 individual evaluations of 80 companies in
r e v. in n ova r vo l . 21, n ú m . 3 9 , e n e r o - m a r z o d e 2011
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five Latin American countries collected by the Reputation
Institute in conjunction with the Foro de Reputación Corporativa. We conclude with some general discussion and
implications.

Literature review
Corporate reputation
Corporate reputation has been examined in many academic disciplines. However, there have been long debates
on its definition and measurement. Fombrun and Van Riel
(1997) regarded corporate reputation as ambiguous. Since
then, significant work has helped clarify this concept by
studying literature differences and similarities to come up
with a clearer corporate reputation definition. According
to Fombrun and Rindova’s (1996) cross-disciplinary literature review, one reason for this conceptual ambiguity is
reputation’s usage by scholars in different disciplines: economics (Ross, 1977; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), accounting (Sveiby, 1997), sociology (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Shaphiro, 1987), strategy (Caves & Porter, 1977; Freeman,
1984), and marketing (Dowling, 1986; Kennedy, 1977)
among others. Therefore, corporate reputation has been
defined and used from disciplinary lenses.
Bennett and Kottasz (2000) assembled a list of 16 corporate reputation definitions. Barnett et al., (2006) then
took this list and added results of their review of studies
from 2000 to 2003 to cluster definitions into three categories: awareness, assessment, and assets. The awareness cluster includes a group of scholars (Balmer, 2001;
Roberts & Dowling, 2002) who define corporate reputation as perception of audience. Another group of scholars (Deephouse, 2000; Gotsi & Wilson, 2001) looks at
reputation as a judgment and estimation, forming the assessment cluster. Finally, the assets cluster includes definitions considering reputation as something of value to
a firm (Drobis, 2000; Goldberg et al., 2003). Barnett et
al. (2006, p. 34) concluded by proposing a definition for
corporate reputation: “Observers’ collective judgments of
a corporation based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the corporation over time”.
The lack of consensus on a corporate reputation definition
has led to the development of measurement tools, which
differ in three ways. First, they differ in their underlying
definitions of corporate reputation. Second, the groups
who assessed reputation differ in order to be consistent
with the underlying theory of the measurement tool. Finally, the items and dimensions in the measurement tools
differ. A wide range of reputation measures have been
re v. innovar vo l . 21, n ú m . 3 9 , e n e r o - m a r z o d e 2 011

developed, such as Fortune’s Most Admired Companies
(MAC), the RepTrack Pulse (Fombrun & Van Riel, 2004),
and the Corporate Personality Scale (Davies et al., 2003).
In this study, as we aim to investigate factors that impact
the general population’s assessment of corporate reputation (versus, for example, financial analysts), we adopt the
RepTrack Pulse corporate reputation measure to investigate the hierarchical effects of corporate reputation stimuli on perceptions of the general public.

Signaling theory
Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) is an information economic theory that discusses the behavior of interacting factors
under information asymmetry and uncertainty conditions.
In signaling theory, two parties interact with each other:
agents or sellers and principles or buyers. The environment
is uncertain and agents have information that principles
do not have. For example, in a marketplace, there are sellers of a product competing with each other that have information about the quality of their products, which is not
necessarily available to buyers. Therefore, sellers try to
send signals such as price, warrantees, or return policies to
buyers to demonstrate higher product quality.
Signaling is a dynamic process. Initially, agents (e.g., sellers) send a signal and principles (e.g., buyers) receive and
translate the signal to separate (distinguish) agents and
make the transaction (e.g., buy). After the transaction,
principles get feedback (of product quality), learn through
this experience and are better able to separate agents
next time. This learning process from agents to principles and vice versa continues until a state of equilibrium
is achieved. Equilibrium occurs in two types: separating
and pooling (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). In separating
equilibrium, the value of a strategy and its cost lead the
agents to choose different actions. For example, maintenance companies can adopt a three-day guarantee
strategy to show the quality of their services, which is a
valuable strategy for buyers to distinguish between companies. If it takes five days to deliver the service, the cost
of a three-day guarantee would be more than its benefits.
Therefore, a low-quality service company would not adopt
this strategy. In other words, in separating equilibrium,
principles can distinguish between agents. Pooling equilibrium is a condition where both low and high quality
agents can choose the same strategy and principles cannot distinguish between them. Both service companies
can deliver their services in three days in this condition.
Therefore, only if separating equilibrium occurs, strategy
can serve as a signal that helps principles to distinguish
between agents (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993).
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Signaling theory has been widely used in management,
marketing, and finance contexts, including studies on
board of director structure (Miller & Triana, 2009), corporate social performance (Turban & Greening, 1997), insider stock trading (Sanders & Boivie, 2004), labor markets
(Spence, 1973), organizational reputation (Behrend et al.,
2009), advertising (Ippolito, 1990), new product introduction (Akerlof, 1970), price (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986),
warranties (Lutz, 1989; Spence, 1977), and initial public
offerings (IPO) (Certo et al., 2001). However, one factor
that has not been sufficiently studied is the multi-level impacts of signals. Accordingly, this study intends to investigate not only the individual effects of signals, but also the
hierarchical effects of them.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In studying multi-level determinants of corporate reputation, three sets of hypotheses are suggested. The first set
refers to industry-level factors informing corporate reputation assessments, while the second set investigates firmlevel corporate reputation drivers. Finally, a third set looks
at moderating impacts of individual-level variables. By doing so, we attempt to disentangle multi-level effects on
corporate reputation perceptions.

Industry Signals
Industry has been established as an important component
of reputation management (e.g., Newburry, 2010; Winn et
al., 2008). In the Latin American context, certain industries, such as telecom, financial and energy, have received
increased scrutiny, mirroring the major investment trends
in the region (e.g., Casanova, 2005). Accordingly, industry may have systematic effects on individual evaluations
of corporate reputation in this context. While the degree
of these effects may vary by industry, we suggest that in
industries where fast changes to the market are occurring
due to deregulation and privatization, individuals will have
lesser abilities to assess the reputations of individual firms,
and accordingly will be more likely to evaluate companies
based upon collective industry reputations (e.g., Winn et
al., 2008), even though these may still be emerging as
well. Company-level information cues upon which to make
supportive behavior decisions may not yet be available, or
may be heavily discounted due to rapid change.
Past research has noted that individuals with complex
knowledge structures about a topic are more likely to include both unfavorable and favorable attributes in their
descriptions of others than those with simple ones are

194

(Gardberg & Newburry, 2010; Linville, 1982). Thus, this
research has found that individuals with less knowledge
about a firm are less likely to punish the firm with negative actions such as boycotting (e.g., Gardberg & Newburry, 2010; Klein et al., 2004). Service industries are often
characterized as having numerous differences from manufacturing, including greater knowledge intensity, intangible products, and customer presence for part or all of
service production (Aharoni, 1996; Boddewyn et al., 1986;
Bowen et al., 1989; Erramilli & Rao, 1993). Building on this
past literature, we suggest that given inherent differences
between manufacturing and service industries, individuals
from the public are more likely to be knowledgeable about
manufacturing industries, where physical products can be
much more easily evaluated. Thus, firms within these industries may be more highly evaluated –particularly in rapidly changing economies where individuals may have had
less chance to experience services. Accordingly, we suggest
the following hypothesis:
H1: Reputation assessments of firms within recently deregulated service industries will be lower than those of
firms within manufacturing industries are.
Previous scholars have distinguished credence goods and
services from other types of goods (e.g. Darby & Karni,
1973; Emons, 2001; Siegel & Vitaliano, 2006). For credence goods, the quality of a good or service is not easily
identifiable by the purchaser through normal use (Darby
& Karni, 1973). Thus, the purchaser relies greatly on the
seller to provide information regarding what product is
needed, along with the quality of the product (Emons,
2001). Additionally, for credence goods, some consumers use external indicators related to a company, such as
the degree to which the company harms the environment,
when evaluating purchasing decisions (Feddersen & Gilligan, 2001). Since easily verifiable performance measures
are not available for credence goods, overall industrylevel signals may be more important to the reputation
evaluations of firms selling these goods and services than
for other types of goods. However, in cases where industry signals are unclear due to a rapidly changing environment, these industries might be most vulnerable to
negative reputations. By contrast, for experience goods
and services or goods where the quality is directly visible, reputation assessment decisions may be less a function of externally evaluated attributes of a firm and more
a function of actual firm characteristics. Accordingly, we
suggest that service industry reputations will be particularly negative for credence service goods, as compared to
experience goods. Thus, we hypothesize:
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H2: Reputations assessments of service firms that sell
credence goods will be lower than those of other service
firms are.

Firm-level Signals
As prior research has established financial performance
and firm size as important predictors of corporate reputation, in the following paragraphs we examine the effects of
these two variables in the Latin American context.
Financial performance. Under conditions of information
asymmetries between a firm and its stakeholders, stakeholder perceptions are formed based on the signals they
receive from a firm’s past and current actions. One such
signal is the financial performance. McGuire et al., (1988)
found that return on assets was significantly correlated
with reputational rankings of firms. To the general public, stronger financial results reflects a superior business
model, more effective management, better resource deployment, more productive personnel, and better overall
fit between resources and strategies. Therefore, high financial performance affects the public’s perception in favor of
firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Investors and creditors,
on the other hand, translate good accounting and financial performance to indicate a company’s healthy and wellmanaged standing and that a company is able to bring
positive results in the future (Helm, 2007). Gabbioneta et
al. (2007) showed that higher financial performance leads
security analysts to a more favorable disposition towards
firms. In total, financial signals affect stakeholders’ perceptions in a consistent way and in return the collective representation of the firm. Therefore, we suggest:
H3: There is a positive relationship between financial
performance and corporate reputation.
Firm size. Another firm-level factor affecting corporate
reputation is size. Large firms have financial resources,
talented employees, advanced technology, and effective
networks that can help them create and support a favorable reputation. However, size is a double-edged sword
and larger firms are more visible to their stakeholders and
therefore more subject to scrutiny of the public, government, and regulatory bodies. While favorable corporate
reputation is a critical firm resource and a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun, 1996), building it is a slow and incremental process
(Hall, 1993) and a firm may lose its favorable reputation
quickly due to a negative event, crisis, or deregulation
(Carter & Ruefli, 2006). Large and more visible firms are
more covered by media and therefore, their stakeholders
are better and faster informed about them. In addition,
re v. innovar vo l . 21, n ú m . 3 9 , e n e r o - m a r z o d e 2 011

people not only expect more from larger corporations, but
also trust them less. In sum, we suggest that firm size provides a negative signal in terms of predicting corporate
reputation, and accordingly, the following hypothesis:
H4: There is a negative relationship between firm size
and corporate reputation.

Individual-level Evaluations
Marginalization is “the process by which established or
emerging elites create socioeconomic relations of superior
versus subordinate/dependent through manipulations of
labor and distributions of social resources” (Arnold, 1995,
p. 88). Strong evidence suggests that certain demographic groups may be more or less advantaged within Latin
American society, based upon gender (Heath et al., 2005;
Skidmore & Smith, 2005), income, social class (Gomez &
Sanchez, 2005; Martinez, 2005), and education level (Koljatic & Silva, 2006). These advantages reinforce each other
through societies that emphasize social contacts (Dávila &
Elvira, 2005; Weaver, 2000) and family-owned businesses (Fogel, 2006; Perkins et al., 2010). This status of being
marginalized could lead to differential levels of identification with firms (e.g., Gardberg & Newburry, 2010; Newburry et al., 2006). Accordingly, being part of a marginalized
group could systematically impact individual-level reputation assessments by limiting the types of information
signals available to an individual to make such an assessment. Herein, we suggest that more marginalized individuals are more likely to identify with firms where they have
had frequent experience with a good or service than with
firms where they have had less close contact. Within the
context of our prior discussion of credence versus experience goods, as experience goods are more easily evaluated that credence goods, this suggests that marginalized
individuals will have relatively more positive assessments
of these goods than their credence counterparts will. Accordingly, we suggest:
H5: Marginalized individuals are more likely to evaluate
experience goods higher than credence goods.

METHODS
We utilize a sample of individual perceptions of companies from the following countries studied by the Reputation Institute in association with The Foro de Reputación
Corporativa: Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.
The analyses contained herein are based upon data collected for this project between January 2007 and July
2008, which is part of a larger ongoing study. Questionnaire items were based upon the Reputation Institute’s
195
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reputation survey, which aims to measure multiple aspects of corporate reputations. Respondents were identified from the respondent pool of a well-established data
collection agency operating in all of the study countries.
To be eligible for the study, potential respondents were
screened to determine if they met the minimal requirement of being at least somewhat familiar with the focal
company of evaluation based on their ability to answer 3
out of 4 general questions regarding the company (Asher,
2004). The population of respondents was also targeted
to be representative of the general population of each
country in terms of gender and age. Questionnaires were
administered via computer assisted telephone interviews
(CATI) in the local language of the respondent (Spanish
or Portuguese). For this analysis, this procedure produced
76,419 usable responses.

Dependent variable
Corporate Reputation is measured using the following
four general items developed by the Reputation Institute
to gage a firm’s overall reputation. Multiple authors have
found that items measuring general perceptions tend to
have greater face validity across cultures than more specific culturally derived items (Newburry et al., 2008; Scandura, Williams & Hamilton, 2001). Respondents evaluated
the items on a 7-point scale, where “1” indicates “I strongly
disagree” and “7” indicates “I strongly agree”. Respondents
also had the option to indicate “Not Sure”. LISREL analyses
confirmed the unidimensionality, convergent validity and
fit of the scale items (Alpha = .933). As interpretation of
items can vary across cultures (e.g., Gardberg, 2006), the
factor structure for the four items was evaluated in each
country and found to be equivalent.

Company data were obtained primarily from company annual reports, and supplemented when needed with data
from the Economatica, Mergent and Hoover’s Online databases. Return on Assets (H3) indicates the 2006 ratio of
net income over total assets for each company, and it was
used to measure financial performance. Firm Sales (H4) indicates the 2006 sales for a company, and it was used to
examine firm size effects.
To examine marginalization effects (H5), we computed
multiplicative interactions between gender, social class,
income and education and the four service industries indicated above. Gender is dichotomous, coded “1” for females and “0” for males. Since appropriate indicators of
Social Class varied by nation, different measures were used
in each country, and then, responses were standardized to
allow inclusion of different nations in the same dataset
(Craig & Douglas, 2000). Thus, this variable is coded “1”
for lower class, “2” for lower middle class, “3” for upper middle class, and “4” for upper class. As living standards differ
significantly between sample nations, different scales were
also used in each nation to examine Household Income.
Responses were standardized across nations, with the variable coded as: “1” for low income, “2” for mid-level income
and “3” for affluent. Education is categorical, coded “1” if
less than a basic education (e.g. elementary school) ranging to “7” if completed graduate school.

Control variables

Independent variables

While the HLM nature of the analysis (see next subsection) controls for fixed effects at the country and company
levels, the following individual-, company- and countrylevel controls were added. Respondent Age is categorical,
ranging from “1” if under 18 to “10” if over 60. Familiarity with a company was measured using the item, “I am
familiar with [Company]”, with responses ranging from 1
(Not at all familiar) to 4 (Very familiar). As respondents
met a familiarity threshold to be included in the sample,
responses for this variable are highly biased towards the
top end of the scale. International Scope measures a respondent’s perception of the scope of a firm’s international activities, based upon the item: “[Company] has
an international scope”, with responses ranging from 1
(Does not describe well) to 7 (Describes very well). Unemployed measures whether the respondent was employed
by a firm at the time of the study.

Industry effects (H1/2) were tested for the Telecom, Retail,
Financial and Energy Provision industries. As the telecom
and retail industries involve much closer interaction with
the service provided, these were considered experience services for our examination, while the financial and energy
provision industries were considered credence services.

At the company level, Foreign HQ is a dichotomous variable, coded “1” if a firm’s headquarters was located outside
the country where a firm’s reputation was being evaluated
and “0” if located in the focal country. Local Years is measured as the number of years that a firm had operated in
a particular market at the time of survey administration.

The items contained in this measure are:
1. [Company] has a good overall reputation.
2. [Company] is a company I have a good feeling about.
3. [Company] is a company that I trust.
4. [Company] is a company that I admire and respect.
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GDP per capita (GDPpc) measures the gross domestic product for each country divided by the population. Additional
controls were considered for Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions, since these have been shown to impact reputation assessments (Deephouse et al., 2009). However, these
were not included due to the limited variance across the
study countries, most of which was already captured by
the GDPpc variable. Strong correlations of three dimensions with GDPpc also created collinearity problems.

Analysis
As our analysis involved a hierarchical data structure with
nested data (Hitt et al., 2007), we used the hierarchical
linear modeling program HLM6 (Raudenbush et al., 2004)
to compute a model with three data levels (individual within company within country). The approach of examining
reputation from multiple analysis levels is consistent with
Barnett and Hoffman (2008), who recently noted the multilevel nature of reputation. While ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression is often used for analyses of this type, OLS
does not account for the interdependence of individual-level data being nested within higher levels of observation. To
minimize multicollinearity, we standardized and centered
the direct effects prior to creating the moderating effects,
with the exception of the binary variables in a manner consistent with Joshi et al., (2006).

RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations
for our study variables. A few high correlations are worth
noting–education with social class, local years with the
telecom industry, and banking with ROA. While multicollinearity analyses suggest that these high correlations are
not significantly impacting our results, they should nonetheless be kept in mind when interpreting the findings. All
study firms sold products or services, and operated facilities in the host country where they were evaluated.
Table 2 presents the basic models used to test our direct
effect hypotheses 1 through 4. All models have significant
Chi-square statistics (p<.001). Model 1 presents the analyses using the full data sample. Models 2 through 6 divide
the sample by country. While the number of companies
evaluated in each country makes it difficult to ascertain
conclusions from the country-specific models, these models do allow us to see the consistent negative coefficients
of our four service industries across markets.
Hypothesis 1 suggested that reputation assessments
of firms within recently deregulated service industries
would be lower than those of firms within manufacturing
industries. Within Model 1, we find mixed support for this
hypothesis. While all four service industry coefficients have
negative signs, consistent with our hypothesis, only two

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Study Variables
SD

1.

1. Reputation

5.64

Mean

1.45

1.00

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

2. Female

0.50

0.50

.07

3. Social Class

2.64

0.95

-.05

-.07

1.00

4. Income

1.55

0.69

-.05

-.09

.27

1.00

5. Education

4.37

1.54

-.08

-.10

.52

.18

1.00

6. Age

5.41

2.70

.05

.03

-.04

.05

-.13

1.00

7. International
Scope

6.00

1.38

.47

.05

-.03

-.03

-.05

.03

1.00

8. Familiarity

3.80

0.40

.08

-.02

.08

.08

.08

.02

.05

1.00

9. Unemployed

0.35

0.48

.06

.27

-.15

-.13

-.17

.09

.03

-.05

1.00

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

Individual Level
1.00

Company Level
10. Telecom

0.29

0.45

-.17

.00

-.03

.00

-.02

-.02

-.07

-.03

-.00

1.00

11. Retail

0.12

0.32

.03

.01

-.00

-.14

.01

.01

-.01

.06

.02

-.23

1.00

12. Energy

0.04

0.19

-.08

-.00

-.02

-.10

.00

.00

-.11

.01

.02

-.13

-.07

1.00

13. Banking

0.22

0.41

.02

-.02

.01

.02

.02

.01

-.01

-.05

-.03

-.33

-.19

-.10

14. Sales06

1.00

37563

68338

-.02

.00

.01

.17

-.02

.00

.05

-.01

-.00

-.04

.06

-.09

-.14

15. ROA

6.71

5.31

.04

.01

-.03

.00

-.03

-.01

.14

.02

.02

.11

-.10

-.07

-.53

1.00
.27

16. Foreign HQ

0.57

0.50

-.05

.00

-.01

.07

-.02

-.00

.06

-.01

-.01

.12

-.16

-.07

.03

.37

.30

1.00

17. Local Years

55.35

44.58

.13

.00

-.01

.01

-.01

.02

.01

.04

.02

-.55

-.03

-.06

.18

-.05

-.12

-.34

1.00

.06

.07

-.00

.04

.10

.01

.01

.05

-.14

.04

1.00

Country Level
18. GDPpc

6199

2092

.01

-.01

-.10

-.17

.00

-.01
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are significantly negative (telecom and energy provision)
when compared to the omitted other industry dummy variable, while a third (banking) is marginally significant.
Hypothesis 2 suggested that reputation assessments of
service firms that sell credence goods will be lower than
those of other service firms will. Again, within Model 1, we
find mixed support for this hypothesis. While both of the
credence industries (energy and banking) had significant
or marginally significant negative coefficients, telecommunications (an experience industry) had a highly significant
(p<.001) coefficient as well.
Hypotheses 3 suggested a positive relationship between
financial performance and corporate reputation, while hypothesis 4 suggested a negative relationship between firm
size and corporate reputation. Contrary to expectations,
neither of these hypotheses was supported in Model 1.

Table 3 presents the basic models used to test our marginalization interaction effect suggested in hypothesis 5.
All models have significant Chi-square statistics (p<.001).
To reduce multicollinearity problems between variables,
interactions with each demographic variable (female, social class, education and income) are examined in separate
models.
Hypothesis 5 stated that marginalized individuals are more
likely to evaluate experience goods higher than credence
goods. The two experience-based industries examined in
our study were the telecom and retail industries, while the
two credence industries were energy provision and banking. We see our strongest result for the telecom industry interactions, which consistent with our hypothesis, are highly
significant across Models 7 through 10. In Model 7, females
are relatively more likely to rate telecom firm reputations
higher than males. In Models 8 through 10, persons of

TABLE 2. Reputation assessment direct effect regression analyses.
Model 1
Full

Model 2
Argentina

Model 3
Brazil

Model 4
Chile

Model 5
Mexico

Model 6
Peru

5.96(.13)***

5.65(.09)***

5.96(.30)***

5.83(.36)***

5.72(.32)***

5.51(.24)***
.10(.03)***

Variables
Intercept
Level 1 – Individual
Female

.12(.01)***

.22(.02)***

.08(.02)***

.14(.02)***

.07(.02)***

Social Class

-.02(.01)***

-.05(.01)***

-.02(.02)***

-.01(.01)

-.06(.01)***

Household Income

-.05(.01)***

-.07(.02)***

.03(.03)

-.01(.02)

-.03(.02)

-.09(.03)**

Education

-.04(.00)***

-.06(.01)***

-.02(.01)+

-.06(.01)***

-.07(.01)***

-.02(.01)*

.02(.00)***

.02(.00)***

.03(.00)***

.01(.00)***

.01(.00)

.01(.00)**

Familiarity

.23(.01)***

.16(.03)***

.19(.03)***

.32(.03)***

.19(.02)***

.25(.05)***

International Scope

.45(.00)***

.42(.01)***

.42(.01)***

.45(.01)***

.49(.01)***

.46(.01)***

Unemployed

.06(.01)***

.07(.02)**

-.01(.03)

.10(.02)***

.04(.02)+

.07(.02)***

-.44(.10)***

-.78(.13)***

-.94(.48)+

Retail Industry (H1/2)

-.15(.11)

-.14(.20)

Energy Industry (H1/2)

-.53(.17)**

Age

.01(.02)

Level 2 – Company
Telecom Industry (H1/2)

Banking Industry (H1/2)

-.18(.10)+

-.45(.13)**

ROA (H3)

-.62(.73)

-.90(.83)

Sales (H4)

-.00(.00)

Foreign HQ

-.13(.08)+

Local Years

.00(.00)

-.49(.53)

-.15(.25)

-.29(.24)

-.47(.55)

-.03(1.68)

-.07(.27)

-.72(.70)

-.66(.39)

-.56(.51)

-.49(.67)

-.44(.39)

-1.60(3.18)

-3.81(3.64)

-2.56(2.55)

-.24(.23)

-.00(.00)**

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

.01(.13)

.03(.33)

-.19(.35)

-.01(.30)

-.25(.20)

.00(.00)

.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

.00(.00)

.00(.00)

152.03***

416.03***

-3.54(1.88)+

Level 3 – Country
GDPpc

-.00(.00)

X 2 Levels 1 and 2

3726.73***

X 2 Level 3

5.67

Deviance

583.25***

255.14***

1080.07***

246757.16

48648.89

35370.82

48599.21

54365.72

59609.88

N – Level 1

76419

14685

10841

15371

16376

19146

N – Level 2

80

19

13

16

15

17

N – Level 3

5

***p< 0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10;
Regressions present beta coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
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TABLE 3. Reputation assessment interaction regression analyses.
Model 7
Female

Model 8
Soc. Class

Model 9
Education

Model 10
Income

5.81(.11)***

5.81(.11)***

5.82(.11)***

Variables
Intercept

5.82(.11)***

Level 1 – Individual
Female
Social Class

.12(.01)***

.12(.01)***

.12(.01)***

.12(.01)***

-.02(.01)***

-.02(.01)***

-.02(.01)***

-.03(.01)***

Household Income

-.05(.01)***

-.05(.01)***

-.05(.01)***

-.04(.01)***

Education

-.04(.00)***

-.04(.00)***

-.04(.00)***

-.04(.00)***

.02(.00)***

.02(.00)***

.02(.00)***

.02(.00)***

Age
Familiarity

.23(.01)***

.24(.01)***

.23(.01)***

.23(.01)***

International Scope

.45(.00)***

.45(.00)***

.45(.00)***

.45(.00)***

Unemployed

.06(.01)***

.06(.01)***

.06(.01)***

.06(.01)***

Telecom Industry

-.51(.10)***

-.47(.10)***

-.48(.10)***

-.49(.10)***

Retail Industry

-.21(.12)+

-.15(.12)

-.16(.12)

-.12(.11)

Energy Industry

-.53(.17)**

-.55(.17)**

-.56(.17)**

-.50(.17)**

Banking Industry

-.25(.11)*

-.22(.11)*

-.22(.11)*

-.22(.10)*

ROA

-.73(.73)

-.71(.73)

-.72(.73)

-.72(.71)

Sales

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

Foreign HQ

-.11(.08)

-.11(.08)

-.11(.08)

-.12(.07)

Local Years

.00(.00)

.00(.00)

.00(.00)

.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

-.00(.00)

Level 2 – Company

Level 3 – Country
GDPpc
Level 1 x 2 Interactions
Female x Telecom (H5)

.07(.02)**

Female x Retail (H5)

.09(.03)**

Female x Energy (H5)

-.07(.05)

Female x Banking (H5)

.06(.02)*

Soc. Class x Telecom (H5)

-.08(.01)***

Soc. Class x Retail (H5)

-.02(.02)

Soc. Class x Energy (H5)

.03(.03)

Soc. Class x Banking (H5)

-.02(.01)+

Educ. x Telecom (H5)

-.06(.01)***

Educ. x Retail (H5)

-.01(.01)

Educ. x Energy (H5)

-.01(.02)

Educ. x Banking (H5)

-.02(.01)*

Income x Telecom (H5)

-.17(.02)***

Income x Retail (H5)

.06(.03)+

Income x Energy (H5)

.10(.05)+

Income x Banking (H5)

.00(.02)

X 2 Levels 1 and 2

3713.86***

3713.69***

3759.07***

3533.57***

X 2 Level 3

2.95

3.14

3.07

3.14

Deviance

246734.64

246695.13

246689.67

246659.87

N – Level 1

76419

76419

76419

76419

N – Level 2

80

80

80

80

N – Level 3

5

5

5

5

***p< 0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.10
Regressions present beta coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
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lower social class, education and income are more likely to
rate telecom firm reputations higher than their less marginalized counterparts.
With respect to our other experienced –based industry,
retail, the results are mixed– the female-retail interaction
is significant in the anticipated positive direction (p<.01),
while it is not significant for the other interactions. Regarding our credence industries, we find two significant
interactions for the banking industry, with female (p<.05)
and education (p<.05), and none for the energy provision
industry.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study investigated industry –firm– and individual-level determinants of individual-level corporate reputation assessments. In a hierarchical linear model, we tested our
theory using 76,419 individual evaluations of 80 companies in five Latin American countries. Overall, our study
results demonstrated that across our sample, firm reputations in the telecom and energy industries are significantly lower than those of manufacturing firms. Additionally,
we found consistent evidence across marginalized groups
(i.e., women, lower social class, education and income) that
they assess telecom industry reputations relatively higher than their less marginalized counterparts. Results were
mixed with regards to marginalized group assessments of
firms from other service industries. Additionally, counter to
expectations, we did not find evidence that firm size or financial performance impact reputation assessments.
Looking at our individual hypotheses, our first hypothesis
suggested that reputation assessments of firms within recently deregulated service industries would be lower than
those of firms within manufacturing industries. While
not conclusive, our results were consistent with this hypothesis as the coefficients of our four-service industry
variables were all in the predicted negative direction, although with mixed significance levels. These results build
upon past scholars who have noted how service industries differ significantly from manufacturing (e.g., Aharoni, 1996; Boddewyn et al., 1986; Bowen et al., 1989;
Erramilli & Rao, 1993) by demonstrating a measurable
difference in the evaluations of these firms within the Latin American context.
Our second hypothesis attempted to disentangle the
reputation assessments of service firms by classifying
them based upon the literature regarding credence versus experience goods and services (e.g. Darby & Karni,
1973; Emons, 2001; Siegel & Vitaliano, 2006). While we
found mixed support for this hypothesis, we believe that
200

demonstrating systematic differences in reputation assessments across service industry segments contributes to a
relatively new literature regarding industry reputations
(e.g., Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; Winn, MacDonald & Zietsma, 2008). Future work might delve more deeply into
the characteristics of service industries, such as the types
of goods and services they produce, which cause some service industries to differ from others.
Our third hypothesis suggested that financial performance
and corporate reputation would be positively related. This
was perhaps the most surprising result of the study, since
the financial performance-reputation relationship is highly
established in many contexts in the reputation literature
(e.g., Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; McGuire et al., 1988). Multiple explanations may exist for this result. One possibility
is that most studies of this relationship have occurred in
developed world contexts, where corporate financial performance may be more easily visible to individuals to use in
their reputation assessments. In developing and emerging
markets, such as the Latin American markets studied herein, performance information or even a uniform understanding of what constitutes firm performance may be lacking.
A second contributing factor to our lack of results is that
our reputation measure was based upon assessments of
the general population, as opposed to many past studies using the Fortune reputation measures or other similar
measures, which are evaluated by company analysts. The
general population may have a much broader view of the
components that contribute to a company’s reputation.
Our fourth hypothesis examined the relationship between
firm size and corporate reputation. Our lack of significant
results here may be driven by our sample, which primarily
consisted of large firms. A sample with more breadth may
produce different results.
Finally, our marginalization interaction results are worth
commentary. We found strong results that marginalized
demographic groups, whether based upon gender, social
class, income or education, rated telecom industry firms
higher than their less marginalized counterparts. Of the
four service industries in our study, the telecom industry is
probably the one where individuals have the closest direct
contact with the provided service, given the ubiquitous
nature of telephone usage around the globe. Thus, this
result is consistent with the expectation that more marginalized groups make reputation assessments to a greater
degree based on their direct experiences than less marginalized groups, who may have better access to less direct
information upon which to make reputation assessments.
Accordingly, the telecom interaction results provide additional evidence that the difference between credence and
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experience goods matters in terms of reputation assessments. However, our other marginalization-service industry
interactions were less conclusive, and thus, these results
suggest that differences between service industries deserve much greater attention in future research.
Past research has suggested that the marginalization of
certain demographic groups in society impacts their attitudes towards firms (e.g., Gardberg & Newburry, 2010).
This manuscript’s results further help elucidate how marginalized groups may differ from their less marginalized
counterparts in the Latin American context.
Overall, previous signaling studies have investigated the
effects of different signals on various desired output factors. In this study, we have attempted to contribute to this
literature by examining reputation signals in a hierarchical
manner so as not only to understand the individual effect
of each signal, but also the hierarchical effects of them. We
found strong effects related to both industry and individual-level variables, with relatively weak firm-level results.
The combination of these results suggests that the reputations of firms are driven by much more than the characteristics of firms themselves, and that firms need to pay
attention to factors beyond their direct control to effectively manage their reputations.

Limitations
We also acknowledge limitations in our study, which provide opportunities for future research. First, corporate reputation is an aggregate of the public’s perceptions about
different aspects of a company, which we only examined
using a general overall scale. Future studies can investigate the effect of other aspects associated with reputation such as quality of leadership, corporate governance,
workplace attractiveness and corporate citizenship. Second, there is a need for deeper and wider investigation of
industry differences and their effects on corporate reputation. Third, there is a lack of studies on country-level determinants of corporate reputation. More detailed analysis
of differences between the countries in our study could
explain more about the mechanisms underlying corporate
reputation. In addition, it is interesting to examine the effects of other country-level factors such as culture, media
effectiveness or penetration, and international involvement. Fourth, our reputation assessments were limited to
a short timeframe. Future studies could examine reputation assessments over a longer timeframe to gain a more
longitudinal picture. Fifth, as Latin American MNCs gain
prominence (e.g., Martinez et al., 2005), the analyses contained herein could be further developed to examine differences between reputation signals of Multilatinas and
re v. innovar vo l . 21, n ú m . 3 9 , e n e r o - m a r z o d e 2 011

foreign firms. This is important since developing nation
MNCs typically display different characteristics than developed nation counterparts (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc,
2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Perkins et al., 2010).
In summary, this study aimed to partially fill gaps in the
corporate reputation literature in two ways. Theoretically,
there is a lack of studies analyzing industry- and individual-level antecedents of corporate reputations, and we help
fill this gap by finding significant industry- and individuallevel effects, in addition to more commonly studied firmlevel variables. Methodologically, this study contributes by
using multi-level variables to predict corporate reputation.
Using multi-level analysis, this study recognizes the interdependence among variables at different levels and captures more accurate effects of lower level variables on our
criterion variable. Therefore, this study suggests further application of multi-level analysis.

REFERENCES
Aharoni, Y. (1996). The organization of global service MNEs. International Studies of Management & Organization, 26, 6-23.
Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the
market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488500.
Arnold, J.E. (1995). Social inequality, marginalization, and economic
process. In T. D. Price & G. M. Feinman (Eds.) Foundations of social
inequality (pp. 87-103). New York: Plenum.
Asher, H. (2004). Polling and the Public (6th ed.), CQ Press, Washington, DC.
Balmer, J. (2001). Corporate identity, corporate branding and corporate
marketing, seeing through the fog. European Journal of Marketing, 35(3/4), 248-29.
Barnett, M.L. & Hoffman, A.J. (2008). Beyond corporate reputation:
Managing reputational interdependence, Corporate Reputation
Review, 11, 1-9.
Barnett, M., Jermier, J., & Lafferty, B. (2006). Corporate reputation: The
definitional landscape. Corporate Reputation Review, 9, 26-38.
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.
Journal of Management, 17, 99-20.
Basdeo, D.K., Smith, K.G., Grimm, C.M., Rindova, V.P. & Derfus, P.J.
(2006). The impact of market actions on firm reputation. Strategic Management Journal, 27, 1205-1219.
Behrend, T., Baker, B., & Thomson, L. (2009). Effects of pro-environmental recruiting messages: The Role of Organizational Reputation.
Journal of Business and Psychology, 24(3), 341-350.
Bennett, R., & Kottasz, R. (2000). Practitioner perceptions of corporate reputation: An empirical investigation. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 5(4), 224-234.
Boddewyn, J.J., Halbrich, M.B., & Perry, A.C. (1986). Service multinationals: Conceptualisation, measurement and theory. Journal of
International Business Studies, 17, 41-57.
Boulding, W., & Kirmani, A. (1993). A consumer-side experimental examination of signaling theory. Journal of Consumer Research,
20(1), 111-23.

201

AIB-LAT 2010

- best paper award

Bowen, D.E., Siehl, C., & Schneider, B. (1989). A framework for analyzing customer service orientations in manufacturing. Academy of
Management Review, 1475-95.
Carter, S.M., & Ruefli, T.W. (2006). Intra-industry reputation dynamics
under a resource-based framework: assessing the durability factor. Corporate Reputation Review, 9(1), 3-25.
Casanova, L. (2005). Latin America: Economic and business context. In
Elvira, M.M. and Dávila, A. (Eds.), Managing human resources in
Latin America (pp. 25-56). London/New York: Routledge.
Caves, R.E., & Porter, M.E. (1977). From entry barriers to mobility barriers. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91, 421-34.
Certo, S., Daily, C., & Dalton, D. (2001). Signaling firm value through
board structure: An investigation of initial public offerings. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 26, 33-50.
Chen, D., Newburry, W. & Park, S. (2009). Improving sustainability: An
international evolutionary framework. Journal of International
Management. 15(3), 317-327.

Fombrun, C. J. (1996). Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate
image, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Fombrun, C. J., & Shanley, M. (1990). What’s in a name? Reputation
building and corporate strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 33, 233-258.
Fombrun, C., & Van Riel, C. (1997). The reputational landscape. Corporate Reputation Review, 1(1/2), 5-13.
Fombrun, C., & van Riel, C. (2004). Fame and fortune: How successful
companies build winning reputation. New Jersey: Pearson Education.
Fombrun, C., & Rindova, V. (1996). Who’s tops and who decides? The
social construction of corporate reputations. New York University,
Stern School of Business, Working Paper.
Freeman, R.E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach.
Boston, MA: Pitman Press.

Craig, S.C. & Douglas, S.P. (2000). International marketing research.
New York: John Wiley.

Gabbioneta, C., Ravasi, D., & Mazzola, P. (2007). Exploring the drivers of
corporate reputation: A study of Italian securities analysts. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(2), 99-123.

Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2008. The multinationalization of developing country MNEs: The case of multilatinas. Journal of International Management, 14(2), 138-154.

Gardberg, N.A. (2006). Reputatie, reputation, reputazione, ruf: A crosscultural qualitative analysis of construct and instrument equivalence. Corporate Reputation Review, 9(1), 39-61.

Cuervo-Cazurra, A. & Genc, M. (2008). Transforming disadvantages into advantages: Developing-country MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 39,
957-979.

Gardberg, N. & Newburry, W. (2010). Who boycotts whom? A social
identity perspective on consumer boycotts. Business & Society,
published online –March 11. doi: 10.1177/0007650309352507.

Darby, M.R. & Karni, E. (1973). Free competition and the optimal
amount of fraud. Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), 67-88.

Goldberg, A., Cohen, G., & Fiegenbaum, A. (2003). Reputation building: Small business strategies for successful venture development.
Journal of Small Business Management, 41(2), 168-187.

Dasu, S. & de la Torre, J. (1997). Optimizing an international network
of partially owned plants under conditions of trade liberalization.
Management Science, 43(3), 313-333.

Gomez, C. & Sanchez, J. I. (2005). HR’s strategic role within MNCs: helping build social capital in Latin America. International Journal of
Human Resource Management, 16, 2189-2220.

Davies, G., Chun, R., Da Silva, R.V., & Roper, S. (2003). Corporate Reputation and Competitiveness. London and New York: Routledge.

Gotsi, M., & Wilson, A. 2001. Corporate reputation: Seeking a definition. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 6(1),
24-30.

Dávila, A. & Elvira, M.M. (2005). Culture and human resource management in Latin America. In M.M. Elvira & A. Davila (Eds.), Managing human resources in Latin America (pp. 3-24). London/New
York: Routledge.
Deephouse, D. (2000). Media reputation as a strategic resource: An integration of mass communication and resource-based theories.
Journal of Management, 26(6), 1091-1112.
Deephouse, D.L., Li, L., & Newburry, W. (2009). Institutional and national culture effects on corporate reputation. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, August.
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational field.
American Sociological Review, 48, 147-60.
Dowling, G.R. (1986). Managing your corporate images, Industrial Marketing Management, 15(2), 109-115.
Drobis, D. (2000). Public relations: Priorities in the real economy. Vital
Speeches of the Day, 67 (1), 15-19.

Hall, R. (1993). A framework linking intangible resources and capabilities to sustainable competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 607-618.
Heath, R. M., Schwindt-Bayer L. A. & Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2005).
Women on the sidelines: women’s representation on committees
in Latin American legislatures. American Journal of Political Science. 49(2), 420-436.
Helm, S. (2007). The Role of Corporate Reputation in Determining Investor Satisfaction and Loyalty. Corporate Reputation Review, 10,
22-37.
Hitt, M. A., Beamish, P. W., Jackson, S. E. & Mathieu, J. E. (2007). Building theoretical and empirical bridges across levels: Multilevel research in management. Academy of Management Journal, 50,
1385-1399.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s Consequences. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Emons, W. (2001). Credence goods monopolists. International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 19, 375-389.

Ippolito, P. M. (1990). Bonding and nonbonding signals of product quality. Journal of Business, 63(1), 41-60.

Erramilli, M.K. & Rao, C.P. (1993). Service firms’ international entrymode choice: A modified transaction-cost analysis. Journal of
Marketing, 57, 19-38.

Joshi, A., Liao, H. & Jackson, S.E. (2006). Cross-level effects of workplace diversity on sales performance and pay. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 459-481.

Feddersen, T.J. & Gilligan, T.W. (2001). Saints and markets: Activists and
the supply of credence goods. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10(1), 149-171.

Kennedy, S.H. (1977). Nurturing corporate images: total communication or ego trip? European Journal of Marketing, 11(3), 120-164.

Fogel, K. (2006). Oligarchic family control and the quality of government. Journal of International Business Studies, 37(5), 578-25.

202

Klein, J.G., Smith, N.C., & John, A. (2004). Why we boycott: Consumer
motivations for boycott participation. Journal of Marketing, 68,
92-109.
r e v. in n ova r vo l . 21, n ú m . 3 9 , e n e r o - m a r z o d e 2011

re v i s ta

innovar

journal

Koljatic, M. & Silva, M. (2006). Equity issues associated with the change
in college admissions tests in Chile. Equal Opportunities International, 25, 541-561.

Roberts, P., & Dowling, G. (2002). Corporate reputation and sustained
superior financial performance. Strategic Management Journal,
23(12), 1141-1158.

Linville, P. W. (1982). The complexity-extremity effect and age-based
stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42,
193-210.

Robles, F., Simon, F. & Haar, J. (2003). Winning strategies for the new
Latin markets. Financial Times, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.

London, T. & Hart, S. (2004). Reinventing strategies for emerging markets beyond the transnational model, Journal of International
Business Studies, 35, 350-370.

Ross, S. (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentivesignaling approach. Bell Journal of Economics, 8(1), 23-40.

Lutz, N. A. (1989). Warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard.
Rand Journal of Economics, 20(2),
Martinez, J. I., Esperanca, J. P. & de la Torre, J.R. (2005). Organizational
change among emerging Latin American firms. Management Research, 3(3), 173-188.
Martinez, P. G. (2005). Paternalism as a positive form of leadership in
the Latin American context: Leader benevolence, decision-making control and human resource management practices. In M.
M. Elvira & A. Davila (Eds.), Managing human resources in Latin
America (pp. 75-93). London/New York: Routledge.
McGuire, J., Sundgren, A., & Schneweiss, T. (1988). Corporate social responsibility and Firm financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 31, 854-877.
Meyer, K.E. (2004). Perspectives on multinational enterprises in emerging economies, Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 259276.
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986). Price and advertising signals of new
product quality. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 796-821.
Miller, T., & Triana, M. (2009). Demographic diversity in the boardroom:
Mediators of the board diversity-firm performance relationship.
Journal of Management Studies, 46(5), 755-786.
Newburry, W. (2010). Reputation and supportive behavior: Moderating impacts of foreignness, industry and local exposure. Corporate Reputation Review, 12(4), 388-405.
Newburry, W., Belkin L., & Ansari, P. (2008). Perceived career opportunities from globalization: Influences of globalization capabilities
and attitudes towards women in Iran and the U.S. Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 814-832.
Newburry, W., Gardberg, N. & Belkin, L. (2006). Organizational attractiveness is in the eye of te beholder: The interaction of demographic characteristics with foreignness. Journal of International
Business Studies, 37(5), 666-686.
Perkins, S., Morck, R. & Yeung, B. (2010). Innocents abroad: The hazards of international joint ventures with pyramidal group firms.
Working paper.
Raudenbush, S., Bryk, A., Cheong, Y.F., Congdon, R., & du Toit, M.
(2004). HLM6: Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling. Lincolnwood, IL, Scientific Software.

re v. innovar vo l . 21, n ú m . 3 9 , e n e r o - m a r z o d e 2 011

Sanders, G., & Boivie, S. (2004). Sorting things out: Valuation of new
firms in uncertain markets. Strategic Management Journal, 25,
167-186.
Scandura, T., Williams, E., & Hamilton, B.A. (2001). Measuring invariance using confirmatory factor analysis and item response theory.
In C.A. Schriesheim and L.L. Neider (Eds), Equivalence in measurement (pp. 99-130), Greenwich, CT, Information Age.
Shaphiro, S.P. (1987). The social control of impersonal trust. American
Journal of Sociology, 93, 623-58.
Siegel, D.S. & Vitaliano, D.F. (2006). An empirical analysis of the strategic use of corporate social responsibility. Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics.
Skidmore, T.E. & Smith, P.H. (2005). Modern Latin America (6th ed.). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Sveiby, K.E. (1997). The new organizational wealth: Managing and measuring knowledge-based assets. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-74.
Spence, A. M., (1977). Consumer misperceptions, product failure and
producer liability, Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 561-572.
Turban, D., & Greening, D. (1997). Corporate social performance and
organizational attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy
of Management Journal, 40, 658-763.
United States Census Bureau. 2009. Hispanics in the United States.
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/
hispanic.html, accessed June 12, 2009.
Weaver, C.H. (2000). Work attitudes of Mexican Americans. Hispanic
Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 22(3), 275-296.
Weigelt, K., & Camerer, C. (1988). Reputation and corporate strategy: a
review of recent theories and applications. Strategic Management
Journal, 9(5), 443-54.
Winn, M., MacDonald, P., & Ziestsma, C. (2008). Managing industry
reputation: The dynamic tension between collective and competitive reputation management strategies. Corporate Reputation Review, 11(1), 35-55.
Wolinsky, A. (1983). Prices as signals of product quality. Review of Economic Studies, 50, 647-658.

203

